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corporation,' which is excluded from gross income under section
108(a)(1)(B), passes through to the S corporation's shareholders, thereby
increasing their basis in the corporation's stock.2 The stakes are high for
taxpayers who hold stock in insolvent S corporations. Frequently, when S
corporations are insolvent, the shareholders have losses which have been
passed through to them, but which they have been prevented from
deducting because of the fact that they have no basis remaining in their
stock.' If the excluded income from the discharge of indebtedness is passed
through to the shareholders, then their basis is increased and the previously
disallowed or suspended losses may be deducted.4
The Tax Court and the Third, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have all
struggled with this difficult issue. In Nelson v. Commissioner: the Tax
Court held that income resulting from the cancellation of debt (COD
income), which is excluded due to the S corporation's insolvency, neither
passes through to the shareholders nor increases their basis in the stock.
While the Tenth Circuit also denied an increase in the basis of S
corporation stock due to COD income in Gitlitz v. Commissioner,6 it
employed different reasoning to reach its conclusion. On the other hand,
the Third Circuit permitted the S corporation shareholders to increase their
basis by the amount of the excluded COD income, thereby enabling the
shareholders to deduct substantial suspended losses in United States v.
Farley Finally, in Witzel v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit permitted
excluded COD income to pass through and increase the sole shareholder's
basis, but only for the purpose of offsetting future suspended losses, rather
than suspended losses existing at the time of discharge.9

1. An S corporation, with respect to any taxable year, is "a small business corporation for
which an election under section 1362(a) is in effect for such year." I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (2000).
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
2. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 116 (1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.
1999); James D. Lockhart & James E. Duffy, Tax Court Rules in Nelson that S Corporation
Excluded COD Income Does Not Increase ShareholderStock Basis, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
287, 288-89 (1999).
3. See I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (2000).
4. See id. § 1366(d)(2).
5. 11OT.C. 114(1998),aff'd, 182F.3d 1152(10thCir. 1999).
6. 182 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1830 (2000).
7. 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1675).
8. 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1693).
9. The Sixth Circuit recently passed on the issue. The court followed Witzel in denying the
passthrough of excluded COD income and an increase in the shareholders' basis which would
enable them to deduct existing suspended losses. See Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F.3d 524,
533-35 (6th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Circuit also considered the passthrough of excluded COD
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With such a divergence of holdings based on substantially the same
facts, it was only a matter of time before the United States Supreme Court
would grant a writ of certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits.
The Court has done so in the Gitlitz case.1" Another interesting
development is that, on December 22, 1999, the Treasury Department
issued final regulations pertaining to the passthrough of S corporation
items to shareholders under section 1366 and adjustments to their basis in
S corporation stock under section 1367.11 These regulations are effective
as of August 18, 1998, the date that the Internal Revenue Service
(hereinafter "the Service") published the proposed regulations. 12 The final
regulations adopt the position that the excluded COD income does not pass
through to the S corporation's shareholders. 3
Given this background, this paper will attempt to sort out the arguments
both for and against the passthrough of excluded COD income to S
corporation shareholders and its resultant increase in the basis of their
stock. Part I of this paper will provide an overview of the statutory
provisions at the center of the debate. In Part LI, this paper will discuss the
four cases set forth above and the reasoning employed by the court in each
case. Finally, Part I of the paper will critique the positions taken by the
courts.
I. STATUTORY OvERvIEw

As noted by Lockhart and Duffy in their article on Nelson and by the
court in Farley,the issue turns on the interaction of sections 1366, 1367
and 108.'
A. Sections 1366 and 1367
The rules for recognition of an S corporation's income by the
shareholders and the effects of income and other items on the shareholders'
basis in the corporation's stock were designed to operate in much the same
manner as the income recognition and basis adjustment rules operate for
income, although the passthrough only increased the amount of the shareholder's capital loss, as
the shareholder did not have any suspended losses. The Eleventh Circuit followed Farleyin holding
that the excluded income increased the shareholder's basis in his stock. See Pugh v. Commissioner,
213 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
10. 182 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. See T.D. 8852, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,641 (1999).

12. See 63 Fed. Reg. 44,181 (1998) (proposed Aug. 18, 1998).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1 (a)(2)(viii) (1999). As the cases discussed in this paper involve
taxable years prior to the effective date of the regulation, the validity of the regulation is not

addressed in any of the cases.
14. See Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 289; United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198,204
(3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1675).
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partnerships. 5 Accordingly, section 1366(a)(1) requires an S corporation
shareholder to take into account a pro rata share of the corporation's "items
of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit the
separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any
shareholder," and a pro rata share of the corporation's nonseparately
computed income or loss when determining the shareholder's tax liability
for a taxable year.' 6 The reason why some items are reported separately to
the shareholders as indicated by the first category in the preceding sentence
is that an individual shareholder's tax liability for a given taxable year
might differ if the item were aggregated with the S corporation's other
income or expenses.' 7
Section 1366(b) provides that the character of any separately stated
items taken into account by the shareholder "shall be determined as if such
item were realized directly from the source from which realized by the
corporation, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the
corporation."' 18 Essentially, this provision ensures that the character of the
item is preserved as it is passed through to the shareholder-i.e., if the
corporation has a long-term capital gain, the pro rata share of the gain
recognized by the shareholder will also be a long-term capital gain.
Under section 1367(a)(1), the shareholder's basis in the S corporation
stock is increased by the pro rata share of separately stated items of income
and nonseparately computed income taken into account by the
shareholder' 9 (or as more commonly stated, passed through to the
shareholder) under section 1366(a)(1). Among other items, a shareholder's
basis in the stock is decreased by: (1) distributions made to the shareholder
which are not includible in the shareholder's income under section 1368;
(2) separately stated losses and deductions passed through to the
shareholder under section 1366(a)(1)(A); and (3) the nonseparately
computed loss passed through under section 1366(a)(1)(B). 0
Because a shareholder's basis in stock may not be reduced below zero,2'
section 1366(d)(1) limits the amount of passed through losses and

15. See S.REP. No. 97-640, at 15-18 (1982), reprintedin 1982-2 C.B. 718, 724-26.
16. See I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A)-(B).
17. A common example would be an S corporation's charitable contributions. In a given
taxable year, some shareholders may have already made contributions on their own that exceed the
percentage limitations for deductibility under § 170, so that the contributions passed through by the
corporation would have to be carried over by these shareholders to future periods. If the
contributions were deducted to arrive at the nonseparately computed income or loss along with
other deductions, then these shareholders would end up being able to deduct charitable
contributions in excess of the limitations imposed by § 170.
18. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1).
19. See id. § 1367(a)(1)(A)-(B).

20. See id. § 1367(a)(2)(A)-(C).
21. See id.§ 1367(a)(2).
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deductions that the shareholder may deduct in calculating the shareholder's
tax liability to the sum of the shareholder's basis in the stock (after the
income items passed through under section 1366(a)(1) and distributions for
the taxable year have been taken into account) and the shareholder's basis
in indebtedness of the corporation (determined without regard to
adjustments under section 1367(b)(2)), 2 For any taxable year in which
passed through losses of the corporation are disallowed by section
1366(d)(1), the disallowed losses are carried over to the next taxable year
and treated as if they were incurred by the corporation in the next taxable
year under section 1366(d)(2). Therefore, disallowed losses are suspended
and carried forward indefinitely. In none of the cases cited above did the
shareholder hold debt of the corporation, so that essentially the shareholder
was limited in deducting losses to the extent of the shareholder's basis in
the stock. Thus, if the excluded COD income were passed through to the
shareholder, a significant amount of suspended losses disallowed in
previous taxable years under section 1366(d)(1) would be deductible in the
year the debt was discharged.
B. Section 108
Gross income includes income realized by a taxpayer upon the
discharge of indebtedness (also referred to as COD income)."3 However,
under section 108(a)(1), "[g]ross income does not include any amount
which (but for [section 108(a)]) would be includible in gross income by
reason of the discharge . . of indebtedness of the taxpayer" in four
circumstances: (1) the discharge occurs in a bankruptcy case under Title 11
of the United States Code; (2) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is
insolvent; (3) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness;
or (4) the indebtedness discharged is qualified real property business
indebtedness.24 The exclusion for insolvency is limited to the amount by
which the taxpayer is insolvent.2 A taxpayer is insolvent to the extent that
the taxpayer's liabilities exceed the fair market value of the taxpayer's
assets immediately before the discharge.26
But as noted by the courts and commentators alike, the exclusion of the
COD income comes at a "price"; section 108(b)(1) requires the taxpayer

22. See id. § 1366(d)(1)(A)-(B).
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. § 61(a)(12).
See id. § 108(a)(1)(A)-(D).
See id. § 108(a)(3).
See id. § 108(d)(3).
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to reduce the taxpayer's tax attributes.27 Section 108(b)(2)(A)-(G) lists the
seven attributes and the order in which they are to be reduced as follows:
(A) Any net operating loss (NOL) for the taxable year of the
discharge and any NOL carryover to such taxable year;
(B) Any carryover to or from the taxable year of the discharge
of an amount for purposes of determining the general business
credit under section 38;
(C) The amount of the minimum tax credit available under
section 53(b) as of the beginning of the taxable year;
(D) Any net capital loss for the taxable year of the discharge
and any capital loss carryover to such taxable year;
(E) The basis of the taxpayer's property;
(F) Any passive activity loss or credit carryover under section
469(b) from the taxable year of the discharge;
(G) Any carryover to or from the taxable year of the discharge
of determining the amount of the foreign tax
for
purposes
28
credit.
When the debt that is discharged is debt of an S corporation, section
108(d)(7)(A) states that subsections (a)- and (b) of section 108 are to be
applied at the corporate level.29 Subsection (a) specifies the circumstances
in which COD income is excluded from gross income, while subsection
(b), as noted above, lists the tax attributes to be reduced.' If attribute
reduction were to be applied at the corporate level, then an S corporation
would generally have only one of the above attributes, the basis of its
property under section 108(b)(2)(E), to be reduced. 31 An S corporation
normally would not have NOLs to be reduced, as there can be no
carryforwards or carrybacks arising for a taxable year for which a
corporation is an S corporation.32 However, section 108(d)(7)(B) provides
that "for purposes of subparagraph (A) of subsection (b)(2), any loss or
deduction which is disallowed for the taxable year of the discharge under

27. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17,2000) (No. 99-1675); see alsoRichard M. Lipton, Different
CourtsAdopt DifferentApproachesto the Impactof COD Income on S Corporations,92 J. TAX'N
207,209 (2000).
28. I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(A)-(G).
29. Section 108(d)(7)(A) also provides that subsections (c) (relating to the discharge of
qualified real property business indebtedness) and (g) (relating to the discharge of qualified farm

indebtedness) are to be applied at the corporate level when an S corporation's debt is discharged.

None of the cases to be analyzed in this paper involve either real property business indebtedness
or farm indebtedness.

30. See I.R.C. § 108(a)-(b).
31. See Farley, 202 F.3d at 207-08; Lipton, supra note 27, at 210.
32. See I.R.C. § 1371(b)(2); see also Lockhart & Duffy, supranote 2, at 290,298-99.
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§ 1366(d)(1) shall be treated as a net operating loss for such taxable
year., 33 So, as a result of section 108(d)(7)(B), there are two potential tax
attributes to be reduced when S corporation debt is discharged: the
suspended losses treated as an NOL and the basis of the S corporation's
property.
Finally, with respect to the timing of the attribute reduction, section
108(b)(4)(A) requires attributes to be reduced after the determination of
income tax imposed for the taxable year of the discharge.
II. THE CASES AND THEm REASONING
A. Nelson v. Commissioner'
While the Tax Court was unanimous in denying an increase in the
shareholder's basis for the COD income, the case produced a majority
opinion and two concurrences. 35 The facts of the case were stipulated and
are as follows. 3 6 The taxpayer, Nelson, was the sole shareholder of an S
corporation that disposed of all of its assets in 1991.' Also in 1991, the
corporation realized $2,030,568 in COD income, which exceeded its losses
by $1,375,790." Both before and after its debt was discharged, the
corporation was insolvent, and, therefore, the taxpayer did not include any
of the COD income in his gross income for 1991.31 The taxpayer increased
the basis of his stock by $1,375,790 and reported a long-term capital loss
on the disposition of his stock for the 1991 taxable year." The Service
denied $1,375,790 of the reported long-term capital loss. 4

33. I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(B).
34. 110 T.C. 114 (1998), af'd, 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).

35. See id. at 130-36 (Beghe, J., concurring); id. at 136-37 (Foley, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 115.
37. See id.
38. See id. As JudgeBeghenotes in his concurrence, the stipulation of facts makes it difficult
to make sense of the taxpayer's treatment of the excluded COD income and the corporation's losses

for 1991. See id. at 132 (Beghe, J., concurring). Apparently, the taxpayer did not first increase his
basis by the $2,030,568 of excluded COD income and then deduct the $654,778 in losses the
corporation had in 1991, which would have been consistent with the taxpayer's argument before
the Tax Court that excluded COD income increases a shareholder's basis and permits current year
and suspended losses to be deducted. See id. at 132-33 (B eghe, J., concurring). Instead, the taxpayer
increased the basis of his stock by $1,375,790, the net of the excluded COD income of $2,030,568
and the corporation's 1991 losses of $654,778, and did not claim a deduction for the losses on his

individual return. See id. at 133-34 (Beghe, J., concurring).
39. Seeid. at l5-16.

40. See id. at 133 n.4 (Beghe, J. concurring). Apparently, as noted by Judge Beghe in his
concurrence, the taxpayer treated the stock as a worthless security.
41. See idat 116.
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As noted by Lockhart and Duffy, the court found three compelling
reasons for denying the taxpayer an increase in his stock basis: (1) the plain
meaning of the language contained in section 108(d)(7)(A); (2) COD
income is tax-deferred rather than tax-exempt and, therefore, is not
required by section 1366(a)(1)(A) to be passed through to shareholders;
and (3) the shareholder would receive a windfall if the basis were increased
for the excluded COD income. 2 Each of these reasons will be discussed
in turn.
1. Section 108(d)(7)(A)
Section 108(d)(7)(A) provides that section 108(a), specifying the
circumstances under which COD income is to be excluded, and section
108(b), pertaining to reduction of tax attributes, are to be applied at the
corporate level in the case of an S corporation.43 The taxpayer maintained
that applying section 108(a) at the corporate level simply means that one
looks at the corporation, rather than at the individual shareholder, to
determine whether the exclusions of COD income for discharges in
bankruptcy or insolvency apply. 4 If, as in the present case, the corporation
is insolvent when the discharge occurs, then the shareholder excludes his
pro rata share of the COD income when it is passed through to him.
The taxpayer addressed the reduction of the NOL attribute under
subsections 108(b)(2)(A) and (d)(7)(B) as follows. Since it is the
shareholder's suspended losses from the year of the discharge under
section 1366(d)(1) that are to be treated as an NOL for the year of the
discharge, this tax attribute must be determined at the shareholder level. 45
In order to properly determine the suspended losses in the year of the
discharge, the taxpayer would have to take into account all of the
corporation's items of income, including tax-exempt income, the separate
treatment of which could affect the shareholder's tax liability, as well as
the corporation's nonseparately computed income for the year of the
discharge.' Because the excluded COD income, which the taxpayer
claimed was tax-exempt income, could affect his tax liability for the year
of the discharge, the taxpayer argued that it would have to pass through to
him under section 1366(a)(1)(A).47 The result is that the COD income
would increase the taxpayer's adjusted basis, which, in turn would reduce

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 297.
See I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A).
See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 120.
See id.
See id. at 119-20; see also I.R.C. §§ 1366(d)(1), 1367(a)(1) & (a)(2)(A).

47. See Nelson, 10 T.C. at 119.
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the amount of losses suspended under section 1366(d)(1) and the amount
of the NOL to be reduced under section 108(b)(2)(A)."
In response to the taxpayer's argument, the court noted that section
108(d) (7) (A)"explicitly provides that the COD income exclusion operates,
for purposes of the subchapter S regime, on the corporate level."'4 9 The
court then applied two principles of statutory construction. First, in
interpreting a statute, a court must apply the provision according to its
plain meaning.50 Second, a specific statutory provision prevails over a
more general provision.51 Thus, the court determined that section
108(d)(7)(a) overrides sections 1366 and 1367, and that, under the literal
language of the statute, the COD income of an S corporation is excluded
at the corporate level and never passes through to the shareholder.5 2
Having applied the plain language of section 108(d)(7)(A), the court
then sought to support its 3conclusion by viewing the provision in the
"overall statutory scheme." The court noted that the taxpayer's argument
whereby the COD income passed through to him was inconsistent with
section 1366(b), which states that the character of any income item passed
through to the shareholders is determined as if the shareholders realized the
item from the same source as the corporation.' This argument is made
much more forcefully by Judge Beghe in the concurrence when he states:
"There's no way, actually or fictively, in which the equivalence rule of
section 1366(b)
could apply to a solvent shareholder of an insolvent S
55
corporation."
The majority also discussed the significance of the different treatment
when the debt discharged is the debt of a partnership.56 Under section
108(d)(6), subsections (a) and (b) of section 108 are to be applied at the
partner level.57 Prior to the amendment of section 108(d) in 1984, those
subsections were also to be applied at the shareholder, rather than the
corporate level, when the debt discharged was the debt of an S

48. See id&
at 120-21.
49. Id. at 121.
50. See id. (citingUnited States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534,543-544 (1940)).
51. See id.at 121 (citing Bulova Watch v. United States, 365 U.S. 753 (1961) and D.
Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204,208 (1932)).
52. See id.; see also Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 297-98.
53. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121; see also Richard M. Lipton, Tax Court Rejects S Corp. Basis
Step-Upfor COD Income in Nelson, 88 J. TAX'N 272,274 (1998); Lockhart & Duffy, supra note

2, at 299.

54. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121-22.
55. Id.
at 131-32.
56. See id. at 122; see also Lipton, supra note 53, at 274; Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2,

at 301.
57. See I.R.C. § 108(d)(6).
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corporation. 8 The court cited the following from the legislative history of
the 1984 amendment: 9 "In order to treat all shareholders in the same
manner, the bill provides that the exclusion of income arising from
discharge of indebtedness and the corresponding reductions in tax
attributes (including losses which are not allowed by reason of any
shareholder's basis limitation) are made at the corporate level."'
Based on this excerpt, the court determined that Congress wanted to
prevent the possibility that shareholders of an insolvent S corporation
might have to treat the COD income differently, depending upon whether
they personally were solvent, insolvent or bankrupt.6 ' The court concluded
that excluding COD income at the corporate level was consistent with this
policy and that, "if Congress had intended a step-up in basis to accompany
the recognition of excluded income at the shareholder level, it would have
provided for statutory language reaching that result." 62
Finally, the court returned to the taxpayer's contention that because
suspended losses are determined at the shareholder level, the tax attributes
in section 108(b)(2) are reduced at the shareholder level. The court
responded that an S corporation shareholder is required to determine the
amount of tax liability and suspended losses for the taxable year of the
discharge "without reference to the excluded COD income."'63 Then, the
suspended losses are "carried to the corporate level pursuant to section
108(d)(7)(A), and converted to net operating losses pursuant to section
108(d)(7)(B)," so that "the remaining 'suspended losses' under section
1366(d) are deemed to be a tax attribute subject to reduction pursuant to
section 108(b)." 4
2. Tax-Deferred Versus Tax-Exempt Income
The taxpayer took the position that the excluded COD income was taxexempt income that had to be passed through to him from the corporation
under section 1366(a)(1)(A) and would increase his basis under section
1367(a)(1)(A)6 The Service argued that the excluded COD income was
tax-deferred income rather than permanently tax-exempt income and,
therefore, did not pass through to the taxpayer.' The Service first

58. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 721 (b)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 966-67
(1984).
59. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122.
60. H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1640 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1264.

61. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122; see also Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 297-98.
62. Nelson, 10 T.C. at 122-23.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 124.
Id.
See id. at 124-25.
See id. at 125.
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maintained this position in Technical Advice Memorandum 94230003.67
The Service also has used it in the final regulations under section 1366 as
the means of denying the passthrough of excluded COD income and basis
step-up to S shareholders.'
The majority accepted the Service's argument, citing the legislative
history of section 108, which stated that one of the purposes of the attribute
reduction scheme was to "insure that the debt discharge amount eventually
will result in ordinary income. ' ' 69 The court also cited language from a case
in which the Supreme Court declared that the effect of section 108 was not
to exempt COD income, but to defer payment of the tax by reducing the
taxpayer's depreciation deductions or increasing the gains on the
disposition of property.70
3. Windfall to the S Corporation Shareholder
The court discussed the fact that when the S corporation's debt was
discharged, the taxpayer neither suffered an economic cost nor made an
economic outlay.7 ' Instead, it was the corporation's creditors who incurred
the economic cost of the debt discharge.72 As the taxpayer was able to
shelter the COD income under section 108, the court opined that
permitting the taxpayer to increase his basis on account of the excluded
COD income
would constitute a windfall and "[grant] him an unwarranted
73
benefit."
The court also found that the basis increase would be inconsistent with
the legislative history of section 108, which provides that any debt
discharge remaining after the taxpayer reduces the tax attributes "does not
result in income or have other tax consequences." 74 If any COD income in
excess of the S corporation's tax attributes were to be passed through to the
shareholders pursuant to section 1366(a)(1)(A), a basis increase would
result. But as an increase in basis would constitute a tax consequence, the
court reasoned that no "excess" COD income could be passed through.75

67. See Lockhart & Duffy, supranote 2, at 292-93 (discussing Tech. Adv. Mem. 9423003
(Feb. 28, 1994)).
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) (1999).
69. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 125 (citing S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2
C.B. 620,625).

70. See id. at 125 (citing United States v. Centennial Say. Bank, 499 U.S. 573,580 (1991)).
71. See id. at 128.

72. See id.
73. Id. at 128-30.
74. Id. at 128 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 2 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2 C.B. 620, 62075. See id
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The court likened the potential windfall to an exemption from tax and
applied the maxim that, in order for the windfall/exemption to be allowed,
the taxpayer "must demonstrate that he comes squarely within the terms of
the law conferring the benefit sought. 76 Clearly, the court felt that the
taxpayer failed to satisfy this burden. The taxpayer's interpretation of
section 108 would increase the basis of his stock and reduce his suspended
losses, and thus, the amount of the NOL attribute to be reduced, so that the
taxpayer would not have to pay the price for excluding the COD income.77
Such an interpretation would be contrary to the "Congressional design of
subjecting income into the indefinite future to taxation." 78 In addition, the
court noted that in two partnership cases concerning taxable years before
the judicially created insolvency exception was codified as section
108(a)(1)(B), 79 a basis increase was not allowed where the COD income
was not recognized under the insolvency exception. s
B. Gitlitz v. Commissioner 1
Taxpayers Gitlitz and Winn each owned 50% of the stock of an S
corporation.82 In 1991, the corporation realized COD income of
$2,021,296.83 At the time of the debt discharge, the corporation was
insolvent to the extent of $2,181,748, and, accordingly, the taxpayers
excluded the COD income from gross income under section 108(a)(1)(B).84
Together, the pre-1991 losses, which were passed through but suspended,
and the pro rata share of the corporation's losses for 1991 totaled
$1,010,648 for each shareholder.85
76. Id. at 129.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389, 3389-3394
(1980).
80. SeeNelson, 110T.C. at 130 (citingBabin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032,1034 (6th Cir.
1994) and Gershkowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984, 1009 (1987)).
As mentioned at the outset, there were two concurring opinions, one drafted by Judge
Beghe and one by Judge Foley. See id at 130-36 (Beghe, J., concurring); id. at 136-37 (Foley, J.,
concurring). For purposes of this paper, the most important aspect of the concurrences is that both
opinions agree with the majority's holding that § 108(d)(7)(A) prevents the passthrough of
excluded COD income to S corporation shareholders. See id. at 131, 136. Thus, the Tax Court was
unanimous with respect to the construction of§ 108(d)(7)(A). The primary reason for the separate
opinions appears to be that the concurring judges believed that whether the excluded COD income
was tax-exempt or tax-deferred was irrelevant in light of the court's interpretation of §
108(d)(7)(A).
81. 182 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1830 (2000).
82. See id. at 1144.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1145, 115 1; see also Richard M. Lipton, The Impactof Excluded COD Income
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Each taxpayer increased his basis by his share of the excluded COD
income, enabling each to fully deduct his share of the corporation's
ordinary losses.86 The Service denied the increase in basis and disallowed
the deduction of the corporation's ordinary losses to each taxpayer." The
Tax Court initially held in favor of the taxpayers in a memorandum
decision, but later withdrew that opinion and rendered ajudgment in favor
of the Commissioner."
The taxpayers presented essentially the same argument as the taxpayer
in Nelson. They claimed that the excluded COD income was tax-exempt
income under section 1366(a)(1)(A), thus passing through to them and
increasing their basis in the corporation's stock pursuant to section
1367(a)(1)(A).89 The court revealed its hand immediately, expressing
concern about the windfall the taxpayers would realize if their argument
were sustained.' Not only would the taxpayers get to exclude the COD
income, but they also would get an increased basis, which would result in
a larger capital loss being reported on the sale of their stock and the
deduction of suspended losses." The court compared the windfall to a
double deduction, which the Supreme Court has proclaimed should not be
permitted in the absence of a "'clear declaration of intent by Congress.'""
As in Nelson, the Service maintained that COD income was excluded
at the corporate level under section 108(d)(7)(A), so that it did not pass
through to the shareholder. 93 Again as inNelson,the taxpayers claimed that
the only purpose of section 108(d)(7)(A) was to have the issue of
insolvency determined at the corporate level.' The court rejected the
Service's position, declaring that "[s]ection 1366(a)(1) makes clear that all
items of income are attributed initially to the corporation."95 The court
stated further that, because there is no income tax at the entity level, the

on S Shareholders-theTenth Circuit Gets Lost in Gitlitz, 91 J.TAX'N 197, 197 & n.4 (1998).
Because the stock was held equally by the taxpayers, each taxpayer's share of the excluded COD

income was $1,010,648, or the same amount as each taxpayer's share of the corporation's total
suspended and current losses. See id.
86. See Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1145.

87. See id.
88. See id.; see also Winn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawnand
supersededby 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1840 (1998).

89. See Gitlit, 182 F.3d at 1147.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 1147-48 (quoting United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969)).

93. See id.
at 1148.
94. See id.
95. Id.
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items of income of an S corporation "must pass through to shareholders
unless they are absorbed by tax attribute reductions."'
Having determined that excluded COD income may pass through to S
corporation shareholders, the court then dealt with the issue of when such
income passed through. Did it pass through before or after the reduction of
tax attributes under section 108(b)(2)?9 7 If the attribute reduction occurs
after the passthrough, the taxpayers would reap the windfall of
simultaneous income exclusion and basis increase, which would result in
deduction of suspended losses. 98
As a preliminary step in this inquiry, the court examined the NOL that
is to be reduced in the case of an insolvent S corporation. Under section
108(d)(7)(B), any losses or deductions disallowed for the taxable year of
the discharge under section 1366(d)(1) are to be treated as a net operating
loss for the year of the discharge. The court determined that, in deriving the
NOL attribute, the shareholders' suspended losses must be added to the
corporation's net operating loss in the year of the discharge. 99
The court recognized that the question of timing turned on the
interpretation of section 108(b)(4)(A), which provides that attribute
reductions are to be made after the income tax liability for the taxable year
of the discharge has been determined."° The court concluded that the
provision is "simply designed to compute certain tax applications" such as
"assessing charitable contribution deduction limitations," rather than
"mandating that attribute reductions be made in the tax year following the
year of discharge."' 1 While the court conceded that if the statute were read
"narrowly and in isolation," it could be interpreted to require that tax
attributes must be reduced in the year after the discharge, the courtjustified
its interpretation as a reading of the Internal Revenue Code "as a whole.""°
Thus, the court held that an S corporation's NOL attribute is reduced by
the excluded COD income before any items for the taxable year of the
discharge are passed through to the shareholders pursuant to section
1366(a)(1).' 0 3
To illustrate the court's interpretation of the NOL reduction, the court
4 In the third example, the
offered four separate examples in a footnote. 10
corporation realizes $500 of COD income and has $100 of net operating

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

100. Seeid.at l149.
101. Id. at 1150.
102. Id.
103. See i.at 1151.
104. See iLat 1150 n.6.
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losses for the taxable year of the discharge, while the sole shareholder has
$200 in suspended losses. The court tells us that the first step in
"calculating its . . . tax return" for the year of discharge is for the
corporation to calculate its COD income.'05 Next, the corporation
calculates its NOL attribute by summing the shareholder's suspended
losses of $200 and the corporation's net operating loss for the year of
discharge of $100, for a total of $300."°6 Finally, the corporation offsets the
excluded COD income against the NOL 107 After the offset, there is $200
in excluded COD remaining. As any discharged debt remaining after all the
attributes have been reduced "'is disregarded, i.e., does not result in
income or have other tax consequences,"' the court tells us that the
remaining $200 of excluded COD income does not pass through to the
shareholder.108
The fourth example in the footnote illustrates the NOL reduction when
the NOL attribute exceeds the excluded COD income. In that example, the
corporation realizes $100 in COD income and has $500 in net operating
losses for the year of the discharge while the taxpayer has $200 in
suspended losses. The NOL attribute is $700 before reduction. After
applying the $100 of excluded COD income, $600 of NOL remains.
According to the court, this $600 of NOL passes through to the
shareholder.1)9
Turning to the taxpayers' situation, the court illustrated the three-step
calculation of the attribute reduction and potential passthrough. First, the
corporation had to compute its COD income for 1991, which was
$2,021,296."0 Then, the corporation had to derive its NOL attribute by
totaling each shareholder's previously suspended losses and pro rata share
of the corporation's operating losses for 1991. The two amounts added
together for each shareholder were $1,010,648, for a total corporate NOL
of $2,021,296. 11 In the final step, the corporation offset the excluded COD
income against the tax attribute."12 In this case, all of the excluded COD
income was used to reduce the NOL. Consequently, not only did the
taxpayers not get to deduct any of the corporation's ordinary losses, but all
of the shareholders' suspended losses "effectively
disappear[ed] and
' 3
[would] have no future tax consequences."
105. See Id. at 1150 n.6 (Example 3).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.at 1147 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 2 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.

7017, 7018), 1150 n.6.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.at 1150 n.6 (Example 4).
Seeid. at 1151.
Seeid.
See id.
Id.
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Finally, the court stated that its holding regarding the application of the
tax attribute reduction rules under section 108(b)(2) was limited to the
context of COD income for an insolvent S corporation and does not apply
to other forms of tax-exempt income." 4
C. Witzel v. Commissioner" 5
The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation that had $5.4
million in debts discharged in bankruptcy."16 Accordingly, the COD
income was excluded from gross income by the taxpayer under section
108(a)(1). 117 The taxpayer had a zero basis in his stock and approximately
$3.0 million in suspended losses under section 1366(d)(1)."' Like the
taxpayers in Nelson and Gitlitz, the taxpayer unsuccessfully argued in the
Tax Court that his basis should be increased by the excluded COD income,
so that he could deduct the $3.0 million in suspended losses." 9
Like the Tenth Circuit, the court expressed its concern about a windfall
to the taxpayer when it stated that the taxpayer wanted to "parlay a $5.4
' 12
million tax exemption into a more than $8 million tax exemption.
Further, the court declared that it was "hard to understand the rationale for
using a tax exemption to avoid taxation not only on the income covered by
the taxation but also on unrelated income that is not tax exempt."''
As in Nelson and Gitlitz,the Service argued to the Seventh Circuit that
the phrase "at the corporate level" in section 108(d)(7)(A) means that COD
income is excluded at the corporate level and is used to offset the
suspended losses which are deemed NOLs under section 108(d)(7)(B). 22
The court noted that the Service's argument was not "conclusive," as the
phrase could be interpreted to mean "just that the relevant bankruptcy
status which triggers a tax exemption for COD income is that of the
corporation, not the shareholder."' 123 But as the Service's position would
prevent a windfall to the taxpayer, the court found that it was the preferable

114. See id.
The court noted that while it was assuming that excluded COD income was taxexempt income, Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) (1999) would not classify it as such. See id. at

1151 n.7. As the regulation was not adopted until after the taxable years in question, the validity
of the regulation was not at issue.
115. 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1693).
116. Seeid. at 496.
117. See id.

118. See id. at 496-97.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
Id.at 497.
Id.
See id.
Il
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interpretation.' 24 Therefore, the court upheld the denial of the deduction of
the $3.0 million
in suspended losses which existed in the year of the
5
discharge.
But the court rejected the Service's claim that COD income does not
increase a shareholder's basis in the S corporation's stock.'26 The court
noted that section 1366(a)(1)(A) requires tax-exempt income to be passed
through to the shareholder, which results in an increase in the shareholder's
basis under section 1367(a). 127 The court took issue with the Tax Court's
assessment"2 and the observation by the Supreme Court in UnitedStates
v. Centennial Savings Bank that excluded COD income is tax-deferred
rather than tax-exempt because of the attribute reduction mechanism.'29 As
stated by the court: "To the extent that the recipient of COD income...
never accrues suspended losses which that income reduces (thus reducing
the tax benefits that
they generate), his COD income will be tax exempt in
130
the fullest sense."'
Thus, the court concluded that the basis in the taxpayer's stock was
increased by the COD income, so that the taxpayer could deduct future
suspended losses.' 3' While the court realized that this position conflicted
with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion in Gitlitz3 1 that the excluded COD

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Seeid.
See id. at 498.
See id.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68

U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Apr. 17,2000) (No. 99-1693) (citing United States v. Centennial Say. Bank,
499 U.S. 573,580 (1991)).

130. Id. The court's view is also contrary to the position adopted in Treas. Reg. § 1.13661(a)(2)(viii), but as the court recognized, the validity of the regulation was not at issue in the case
because it became effective after the tax year in question. See id.
131. See id. Oddly enough, the court never specifies the dollar amount by which the basis is
to be increased. It is unclear as to whether the basis would be increased by the full $5.4 million in
excluded COD income or simply the $2.4 million excess of the excluded income over the
suspended losses. The court suggests the $5.4 million adjustment when itdiscusses whattheService
is asking it to accomplish in the S corporation context what the Code provides for in the partnership
context. With respect to the discharged debts of an insolvent partnership, the partner's basis is
increased by the partner's share of the COD income and then reduced by the partner's share of the
decrease in the partnership's liabilities. See id.
Commentators Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby interpret the opinion as calling
for a$2.4 million increase. See Burgess J.W. Raby &William L. Raby, DO! 'Windfall'Resurrected
for S Corp Shareholders, 86 TAX NOTES TODAY 819, 821 (2000). On the other hand, other
commentators have refrained from placing a dollar amount on the basis adjustment. See Lipton,
supra note 27, at 209.
132. See the discussion of the court's examples of attribute reduction in Gitlitz v.
Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143, 1150 n.6 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,120 S.Ct. 1830 (2000),
supra text accompanying notes 105-110.
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income did not pass through to shareholders after reduction of the
corporation's NOL, the court stated that the issue would be moot if the
taxpayer never again had suspended losses.'3 3 On the other hand, the issue
would not be moot if the taxpayer were to dispose of the stock."3
135
D. United States v. Farley

The taxpayers owned stock in two different S corporations.136 The
taxpayers had a zero basis in their stock by the end of the 1987 tax year, so
that losses passed through to them by the corporation were suspended
under section 1366(d)(1).137 In 1992, the corporations ceased operating,
and the corporation's secured creditors forgave all debts not satisfied by
the sale of the corporation's assets. 38 Due to the corporation's insolvency,
the COD income was excluded from gross income under section
108(a)(1)(B). 3 9 In 1995 and 1996, the taxpayers filed amended returns
seeking refunds for four tax years on the theory that their basis had
increased as a consequence of the COD income and that the suspended
losses were deductible."U The Service issued the refunds, but then later
determined that the taxpayers were not entitled to them because their basis
had not been increased by the COD income. The Service brought suit to
motion for
recover the refunds, and the district court granted the Service's
42
summary judgment, relying on Nelson v. Commissioner.1
1. Section 108(b)(4)(A) and Section 108(d)(7)(A)
Once again, the taxpayers argued that the excluded COD income passed
through to them pursuant to section 1366(a)(1)(A), resulting in an increase
in the basis of their stock under section 1367(a)(1)(A).' 43 The court stated
that resolution of the issue depended upon the interaction of section
108(d)(7)(A) and section 108(b)(4)(A).'" According to the court, section
108(d)(7)(A) imposes two requirements when the debt of an insolvent S
corporation is discharged: (1) the determination of solvency is to be made

133. See Witzel, 200 F.3d at 498.
134. See id.
135. 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1675).
136. See id. at 199.
137. See id. at 199-200.
138. See id. at 200.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 200-01.
142. See id. at 201.
143. See id. at 203-04.
144. See id. at 205.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/4

18

Loebl: Does the Excluded COD Income of an Insolvent S Corporation Increa

INSOLVENTS CORPORATION

at the corporate level rather than the shareholder level; and (2) the tax
attributes to be reduced under section 108(b) are those of the corporation,
not the individual shareholder.' 45 With respect to section 108(b)(4)(A),
which provides that attribute reductions are to be made after the
determination of income tax liability for the year of discharge, the court
declared that the statute unambiguously requires the tax attributes to be
reduced on the first day of the tax year following the year of the
discharge."'
Thus, contrary to the Tenth Circuit in Gitlitz, the court held that
attribute reduction occurs after the COD income has passed through to the
shareholders. 47 The court reasoned that the passthrough of the COD
income was a "necessary prerequisite" to determining the shareholders'
income tax liability for the year of the discharge.148 Consequently, the court
upheld the taxpayers' position that the income passed through to the
taxpayers, increased
their basis and entitled them to take deductions for the
49
suspended losses. 1
2. The Court's Response to the Government's Arguments
After holding in the taxpayers' favor, the court addressed six separate
assertions made by the Service and discussed two pieces of legislative
history which it determined to be relevant. First, the Service contended that
the taxpayers would get an "unjustified tax windfall."' 5 The court
responded that the only case the Service provided to support this argument
was Gitlitz, which held contrary to the clear and unambiguous statutory
language at issue. 151 Furthermore, in the court's opinion, the legislative
history of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 cited by the
1 52
Service tended to support the court's holding as will be discussed below.
Second, the Service asserted that the taxpayers' argument effectively
reads out of the Code the requirement of subsections 108(b)(2)(A) and
108(d)(7)(B) which states that excluded COD income must reduce 53
S
corporation net operating losses for the taxable year of the discharge.1
Although section 108(d)(7)(B) provides that any loss, disallowed under
section 1366(d)(1) in the taxable year of discharge is to be treated as a net
operating loss for that year, the court found it does not indicate that COD

145. See id.
146. See id. at 205-06.
147. See id. at 206.

148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.

151. See id. at206-07.
152. See idU
at 207; see also infra text accompanying notes 174-81.
153. See Farley, 202 F.3d at 207.
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income must reduce net operating losses for the taxable year of the
discharge.154 The court also rejected the Service's "corollary" argument
that, as S corporations do not have most of the attributes listed in section
108(b)(2), the taxpayers' interpretation of section 108(b)(4)(A) negates the
tax attribute reduction scheme of section 108(b). 5 While the passed
through COD income may eliminate suspended losses and the NOL
attribute, the court noted that an insolvent S corporation could still have the
attribute listed in section 108(b)(2)(E), namely, basis in its assets. Because
this attribute could be present on the first day of the year following the
taxable year of the discharge, the court's construction
of the statute would
156
give "operative effect" to all of section 108(b).
Third, the Service maintained that, under section 108(d)(7)(A),
excluded COD income never passes through to S corporation shareholders.
Instead, it is either completely "absorbed by the S corporation's net
operating losses or, if not completely absorbed, is disregarded."'5 7 The
problem with this argument, according to the court, is that it focuses on
where the attribute reduction occurs rather than the real issue, which is
whether the reduction occurs before or after the excluded income is passed
through to the shareholders. 5 '
Fourth, the Service claimed that the taxpayers' interpretation would
place section 108(d)(7)(A) in conflict with section 1366(b).' 59 The Service
cited the following passage from Judge Beghe's concurrence in Nelson:
"'There's no way, actually or fictively, in which the equivalence rule of
section 1366(b) could apply to a solvent shareholder of an insolvent S
corporation. '"°The court opined that Judge Beghe' s statement "is simply
incorrect" because § 1366(b) can apply and "does so 'fictively' as required
by the statute."' 6 ' Also, the court determined that section 1366(b) and
section 108(d)(7)(A) address two different issues-the former deals with
the character of income passed through to the shareholder, while the latter

154. See id.
155. See id.

156. See id. at 207-08 (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)).
157. Id. at 208. As the court noted, the Service's argument about the absorption of excluded
COD is precisely what theTenth Circuit held in Gitlitz. See supranotes 104-13 and accompanying
text.
158. See Farley,202 F.3d at 208.
159. Section 1366(b) provides in pertinent part: "The character of any item included in a
shareholder's pro rata share under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall be determined as if such
item were realized directly from the source from which realized by the corporation.. . ." I.R.C. §
1366(b).
160. Farley,202 F.3d at 208 (quoting Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 131-32 (1998)
(Beghe, J., concurring), aft'd, 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999)).
161. Id.
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deals with exclusion of COD income and the reduction of tax attributes
pursuant to section 108(a) and (b).62
The Service also argued that the exclusion of COD income coupled
with the increase in the shareholder's basis would constitute a "double tax
benefit" that is "fundamentally at odds with the structure of Subchapter
S."' 6 3 The court pointed out that when life insurance proceeds and interest
on state and local bonds are excluded from gross income under section 101
and section 103, respectively, the shareholder's basis is increased under
sections 1366 and 1367, resulting in a "double tax benefit."' 6Furthermore,
even if the Service's assertion was correct, the court stated that it would
not be free to ignore "unambiguous statutory language."' 1
Finally, the Service argued that the excluded COD income was taxdeferred income rather than tax-exempt income, and, therefore, did not
pass through to the shareholders under section 1366(a)(1)(A). The court
agreed with Judge Beghe's concurrence in Nelson that the issue was
irrelevant. 66 As the court stated: "The statute is clear-all income, taxexempt or otherwise, passes through to the shareholders of an S
corporation pursuant to section 1366(a)(1)(A)."' 67 In addition, the court
noted that excluded COD income is not always tax-deferred. If excluded
COD income exceeds the suspended losses/net operating losses, the excess
is disregarded and, therefore, is tax-exempt. 168 The court could not accept
classifying income entirely as tax-deferred
when it is sometimes tax1 69
tax-exempt.
sometimes
deferred and
Turning to the legislative history of Subchapter S and section 108, the
court found two items supporting its conclusion that the excluded COD
income passes through to shareholders with a resultant increase in stock
basis. The first was the Senate Report prepared in conjunction with the
Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982.170 The Report provides that "'both
taxable income and not taxable income and deductible and nondeductible
expenses will serve, respectively, to increase and decrease a subchapter S
shareholder's basis in the stock of the corporation."""' So whether the
excluded COD income is tax-exempt or tax-deferred, the court reasoned
that the reference to "not taxable" income in the Senate Report would
162. See id. at 209.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 207 n.5, 209 (citing Lockhart & Duffy, supranote 2, at 303).
165. Id. at209.
166. See id. (citing Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 130, 134 (1998) (Beghe, J.,
concurring), aft'd, 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999)).
167. Id.
168. See id. at210n.8.
169. See id. at 210.
170. See id.

171. Id. at 210 (quoting S.REP. No. 97-640, at 18 (1982)).
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for
encompass excluded COD income. 72 Thus, Congress intended
7
1
basis.1
stock
shareholder's
S
the
increase
to
excluded COD income
The second item the court felt was relevant was the following language
from the House Report on the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, which
enacted the exclusion of income from the discharge of qualified real
property business indebtedness:"
In applying this provision to the discharge of indebtedness
of an S corporation... the exclusion and basis reduction are
both made at the S corporation level (sec. 108(d)(7)). The
shareholders' basis in their stock is not adjusted by the
amount of debt discharge income that is excluded at the
corporate level. As a result of these rules, if an amount is
excluded from the income of an S corporation under this
provision, the income flowing through to the shareholders
will be reduced (compared to what the shareholders' income
would have been without the exclusion). Where the reduced
basis in the corporation's depreciable property later results in
additional income (or a smaller loss) to the corporation
because of reduced depreciation or additional gain (or smaller
loss) on disposition of the property, the additional income (or
smaller loss) will flow through to the shareholders at that
time, and then will result in a larger increase (or smaller
reduction) in the shareholder's basis than if this provision had
simply defers
not previously applied. Thus,
7 5 the provision
income to the shareholders.
The court conceded that the above quote could be interpreted to mean
that excluded COD income does not pass through to shareholders and,
consequently, increase their basis in the corporation's stock. 176 But the
court agreed with one commentator, Richard M. Lipton, that if Congress
had meant to take this approach with respect to all debt discharges, and not
just the discharges under section 108(a)(1)(D), such an interpretation could
have been viewed as a change in preexisting law."77 However, as Lipton
noted, the Service did not cite this legislative history in Technical Advice
Memorandum 9423003, which adopted the position that excluded COD

172. See id. at210&n.9.
173. See id. at211.

174. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(D).
175. United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1675) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 624-25
(1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 855-56).
176. See id.
177. See id. (citingRichard M. Lipton, IRS ChallengesS CorporationBasisIncreaseforCOD
Income, 81 J. TAX'N 340,344 (1994)).
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income of an insolvent S corporation did not pass through to S
shareholders and was issued many months after enactment of the 1993
legislation.17 The court opined that if the Service had "really viewed the
language in section 108(a)(1)(D) as a change in preexisting law, certainly
it would have taken that position in [Technical Advice Memorandum]
9423003. ,' 17
The court also found it significant that Congress did not amend sections
1366 and 1367 when it enacted section 108(a)(1)(D) in 1993. These factors
led the court to agree with Lipton that "a plausible interpretation of the
legislative history of section 108(a)(1)(D) is that it 'applies solely for
purposes of an S corporation's election to exclude COD income on the
discharge of qualified real property business indebtedness-by its terms,
it does not apply to discharges of other types of debt."'1 s The court
declared that it was unlikely that Congress would determine how basis
adjustments were to be made pursuant to sections 1366 and 1367 by its
comments on the application of another section of the Internal Revenue
Code, namely, section 108.81

Finally, the court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the legislative
history provides very little insight."8 2 But, because the statutory language
was clear and unambiguous in the court's view, the83legislative history was
unnecessary to the court's disposition of the case.1
DL

CRITIQUE OF THE CASES

The four opinions have offered four approaches to the question of
whether the excluded COD income of an insolvent S corporation passes
through to its shareholders and increases their basis so that they may
deduct suspended losses. When the Supreme Court considers the issue, it
is unlikely to adopt the approaches in Gitlitz and Witzel which, as
discussed below, rely on an unreasonable construction of the timing of
attribute reduction under section 108(b)(4)(A). Ultimately, the Supreme
Court's resolution of the issue will turn on its interpretation of section
8
108(d)(7)(A) and that statute's interaction with sections 1366 and 1367. "4

178. See id. (citing Lipton, supra note 177, at 344).
179. Id.

180. Id. (quoting Lipton, supra note 177, at 344).
181. See id
182. See id. at 212 (citing Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1830 (2000)).
183. See id.
184. The Tax Court did accept the Service's argument that the excluded COD income did not

pass through to shareholders because it was tax-deferred income, rather than tax-exempt income
within the meaning of § 1366(a)(1)(A). The Service has also adopted this position in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) (1999). There are two reasons why the Supreme Court will most likely reject
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There are compelling arguments in favor of the Tax Court's interpretation
of section 108(d)(7)(A) which are examined below. Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will agree with the Tax Court that the statute operates to
exclude COD income at the corporate level and prevent such income from
passing through to the shareholders.
A. Gitlitz and Witzel
In Gitlitz, the Tenth Circuit's decision rested on the premise that tax
attribute reduction pursuant to section 108(b)(2) preceded the passthrough
of excluded COD income.18 5 The court came to this conclusion despite the
language in section 108(b)(4)(A) that the "reductions... shall be made
after the determination of the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable
year of the discharge." Because the determination of income tax liability
for the year of the discharge cannot be made until the taxable year closes,
the phrase is commonly interpreted to mean that the attribute reduction
of the taxable year succeeding the taxable
takes place as of the beginning
86
year of the discharge.
Rather than interpreting the statute in accordance with its unambiguous
language, the Tenth Circuit decided it had to read the Code as a whole so
as to carry out the purpose of the statute.8 7 But the court failed in this
regard because, as Lipton notes, its interpretation violates the policy of not
having the insolvent taxpayer pay tax immediately on the COD income.' 88
Lipton offers the following example to illustrate the point:
In 1999, Jack, an insolvent individual, has $1,200 of NOLs,
COD income of $1,000, and $700 of income from personal
services. If attribute reduction occurs first, Jack would be
this argument. First, the legislative history of sections 1366 and 1367 indicates that taxable and "not
taxable" income would increase an S shareholder's basis in the corporation's stock. As noted in
Farley,the reference to "not taxable" would incorporate tax-deferred as well as tax-exempt income.

See United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 210 n.9 (3d Cir.), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W.
3670 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1675); supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
A second argument is found in the legislative history of § 108. The Senate Report
provides that after tax attribute reductions have been made pursuant to § 108(b)(2), any "remaining
debt discharge amount is disregarded, i.e., does not result in income or have other tax
consequences." S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 2 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7018.
Thus, if the excluded COD income exceeds the tax attributes to be reduced, the excess is

disregarded and, thus, exempt from income. As the Third Circuit stated, it is difficult to accept
classifying COD income as "simply tax-deferred" when it is sometimes tax-deferred and sometimes
tax-exempt. Farley,202 F.3d at 210 & n.8; see also supra text accompanying notes 166-69.

185. See Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1149-50; see also supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
186. See Farley,202 F.3d at 205; see also Lipton, supra note 85, at 201 & n.18; Raby & Raby,
supra note 131, at 821.
187. See Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1149; see also supra text accompanying note 102.
188. See Lipton, supra note 85, at 201.
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required to reduce his NOL to $200 as a result of the
exclusion of COD income, and he would have to pay tax on
$500 of his services income. Under Section 108(b)(4)(A),
Jack should be entitled to first apply his NOLs against his
services income, resulting in a net NOL of $500. After his
COD income is excluded, Jack would be required to reduce
his remaining tax attributes (the $500 NOL) by the COD
income excluded ($ 1,000), resulting in the elimination of the
remaining NOL."'
Based on the above, the court's construction of section 108(b)(4)(A)
cannot be sustained. While the Supreme Court could affirm the result in
Gitlitz, preventing the passthrough of excluded COD income to S
corporation shareholders, it could not do so employing the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning.
While Witzel would permit the S shareholder an increase in basis, it
would only permit future suspended losses to be deducted, not existing
suspended losses."9 Implicit in the court's holding is that attribute
reduction occurs at the corporate level before the excluded COD income
passes through to shareholders.' 9 ' In this respect, Witzel is similar to Gitlitz
and, consequently, the reasoning in Witzel is also flawed.
B. Nelson and the Constructionof Section 108(d)(7)(A)
1. The Plain Meaning of Section 108(d)(7)(A)
Section 108(d)(7)(A) provides that section 108(a) is to be "applied at
the corporate level." In interpreting section 108(d)(7)(A), the Tax Court
held that the statute "mandate[s] that insolvency is determined-and COD
income is excluded from gross income of an S corporation under section
108(a)-at the corporate level."' 92 On the other hand, the Third Circuit and
commentators have concluded that section 108(d)(7)(A) simply requires
that the determination of whether the bankruptcy or insolvency exceptions
of section 108(a)(1) apply is to be made by examining the S corporation's
status (solvent, insolvent, or bankrupt) rather than that of the individual

189. Id.
190. See Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 496,498 (7th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed,
68 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1693); see also supra text accompanying notes
123-32.
191. See Raby&Raby,supra note 131, at821.
192. Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 121 (1998), af'd, 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.

1999).
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shareholder.' 93 To determine which interpretation is more appropriate, a
review of the provisions of section 108(a) is in order.
Section 108(a)(1) states that "[g]ross income does not include any
amount which.., would be includible in gross income by reason of the
discharge .

.

.

of indebtedness of the taxpayer" in four specific

circumstances, including when the discharge occurs in bankruptcy or when
the taxpayer is insolvent. In debt discharges in which more than one of the
circumstances specified in section 108(a)(1) apply, section 108(a)(2)
provides the order in which the exclusions under section 108(a)(1) are to
be applied. Finally, section 108(a)(3) limits the exclusion of COD income
when the taxpayer is insolvent to the amount by which the taxpayer is
insolvent.
One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that when the
language of a statute is unambiguous, it is the court's duty to construe the
statute in accordance with its plain meaning, absent any legislative
indication to the contrary. 94 As section 108(a) provides for the exclusion
of COD income from gross income as well as requiring a determination of
the taxpayer's status as bankrupt or insolvent, the plain language of section
108(d)(7)(A) would seem to require that the COD income is excluded from
gross income at the corporate level in addition to requiring that the
determination of bankruptcy or insolvency be made with reference to the
corporation rather than the individual shareholder. Furthermore, no
legislative indication contrary to this interpretation is found in the House
Report on the 1984 amendment of section 108(d). 195 The Report states: "In
order to treat all shareholders in the same manner, the bill provides that the
exclusion of income arising from discharge of indebtedness and the
corresponding reductions in tax attributes (including losses which are not
allowed by reason of any shareholder's basis limitation) are made at the
corporate level."' 9
If the scope of section 108(d)(7)(A) were as narrow as the Third Circuit
and commentators claim, one would think that the language in the statute
and the House Report would have been drafted more precisely. Because the
Tax Court's construction of section 108(d)(7)(A) accords with the plain
meaning of the statute, it is the preferred construction.

193. See United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2000),petitionforcert.filed, 68

U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1675); see also Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at
297-98.
194. See Nelson, I 10T.C. at 121 (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.

534, 543-44 (1940)).
195. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1640 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1264.
196. Id.
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2. Legislative History of Section 108(a)(1)(D)
The legislative history of section 108(a)(1)(D), which excludes COD
income relating to qualified real property business indebtedness, also lends
support to the Tax Court's position. The House Report provides that in
applying section 108(a)(1)(D) to an S corporation, the exclusion and basis
reduction are both made at the corporate level, and the shareholders' basis
in their stock is not adjusted by the amount of COD income excluded at the
corporate level.' 97 The House Report further states that the effect of the
exclusion and basis reduction being made at the corporate level is to
simply defer income to the shareholders." 8 Although the enactment of
section 108(a)(1)(D) came nine years after the enactment of section
108(d)(7)(A), the "view of a later Congress" has "persuasive value" as to
the meaning of earlier legislation!" 9 This should especially be true when
the section 108(a)(1)(D) exclusion is analogous to the exclusions of COD
income in bankruptcy or insolvency situations. 2" As in bankruptcy and
insolvency cases, a discharge of debt under section 108(a)(1)(D) involves
an exclusion of COD income and a reduction of a tax attribute, specifically
depreciable real property.
But as discussed above, Lipton and the Third Circuit conclude that this
legislative history applies only to the discharge of qualified real property
business indebtedness and not to the discharges of other types of debt."
This conclusion is based, in part, on the fact that the Service did not cite
to the House Report when ruling in Technical Advice Memorandum
9423003 that excluded COD income did not pass through to S corporation
shareholders. 2' The court also noted that Congress did not amend sections
1366 and 1367. The court reasoned that Congress would not have included
comments in the legislative history of section 108 if it had intended to alter
the usual manner in which income was passed through and basis was
determined pursuant to sections 1366 and 1367. 203
In response to the Third Circuit and Lipton, the subsequent failure of
the Service to cite to the House Report in issuing the Technical Advice

197. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 624-25 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 85556; see also supra text accompanying notes 175-82.
198. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 624-25 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,855-

56.
199. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773,784-85 (1983).
200. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)-(B).
201. See United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198,211 (3d Cir. 2000),petitionfor cert.filed,68

U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17,2000) (No. 99-1675) (citing Richard M. Lipton, IRS ChallengesS
CorporationBasis Increasefor COD Income, 81 J. TAX'N 340, 344 (1994)); see also supra text

accompanying notes 175-82.
202. See Farley, 202 F.3d at 211 (citing Lipton, supra note 177, at 344).
203. See id.
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Memorandum is of little, if any, relevance when attempting to discern the
intent of Congress in enacting section 108(d)(7)(A). Furthermore, it would
not be unprecedented for an exception to the general rule of a statute, such
as section 1366(a), to be provided in a separate statute. In fact, this often
happens in the Code. 204 Finally, if no amendment to sections 1366 and
1367 were necessary to have COD income from the discharge of qualified
real property indebtedness excluded at the corporate level, there is no
reason why those sections would have to have been amended to have COD
income from other analogous debt discharges excluded at the corporate
level.
3. Overall Statutory Scheme
The Tax Court's interpretation of section 108(d)(7)(A) is also
appropriate because it makes sense when viewed in the context of the
"overall statutory scheme." 205 Specifically, it makes sense in view of
section 1366(b) and the purposes of the reduction of tax attributes pursuant
to section 108(b). Section 1366 (b) provides that the character of an item
of income passed through under section 1366(a)(1) "shall be determined
as if such item were realized directly from the source from which realized
by the corporation." 206 As noted both by the majority and Judge Beghe, if
the COD income of an insolvent S corporation were passed through to a
solvent shareholder, it would be impossible for the requirements of section
108(d)(7)(A) and section 1366(b) to be satisfied simultaneously. Under
section 108(d)(7)(A), the income is to be excluded because the corporation
is insolvent. But, had the solvent shareholder personally realized the
discharged debt, the debt would not have been discharged when the
shareholder was insolvent, and the shareholder would not qualify for the
exclusion of COD income under section 108(a)(1)(B).Y In order for the
COD income to be passed through and excluded by the solvent
shareholder, section 1366(b) would have to be ignored. But courts must
interpret statutes so as to give effect to each related provision.2 '
Accordingly, the Tax Court's interpretation is preferable because it gives
effect to related provisions.
The Third Circuit dismissed the preceding argument by asserting that
section 1366(b) and section 108(d)(7)(A) address different issues at
different levels-section 1366(b) pertains to the character of passed
204. An example would be the deduction for traveling expenses under § 162(a)(2) and the 50%
limitation on deductibility of meals under § 274(n)(I).
205. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110T.C. 114,121 (1998), af'd, 182F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
206. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1).
207. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121-22, 131-32.
208. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1992).
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through income, while section 108(d)(7)(A) deals with the requirements
for exclusion of COD income and attribute reduction under section 108(a)
and (b).20 Such an answer does not address the anomaly pointed out by the
Service and the Tax Court.
With respect to section 108 and the reduction of tax attributes,
Congress intended to defer, but eventually collect within a reasonable
period, the tax on the ordinary income realized from the discharge of
debt.21° While Congress hoped that tax could ultimately be collected on
COD income, it realized that, in many cases, the excluded COD income
would exceed the taxpayer's tax attributes and, thus, would not have any
tax consequences. 21' Excluding COD income passthrough to S
shareholders and increasing the basis of their stock seems inconsistent with
the underlying policy of section 108(b)(2). If the passthrough was
permitted, no matter what amount of tax attributes were reduced, the
shareholders would get an offsetting tax benefit from the passthrough that
equaled or exceeded the amount of deferred COD income that eventually
would be recognized.
An example will illustrate this point. Assume X Corporation, an
insolvent Subchapter S corporation, has $500 of COD income in the year
2000 and $150 of basis in its property, and its sole shareholder, A, has
$100 in losses suspended from prior tax years and a zero basis in his stock.
If the COD income which is excluded because X is insolvent passes
through to A, A's basis would increase to $500 before taking the suspended
losses into account. A would be able to deduct the $100 in suspended
losses, and his basis would be $400. There would be no NOL attribute to
be reduced under section 108(b)(2)(A) and section 108(d)(7)(B). The basis
of X's property would be reduced to zero, and the remaining $350 of
excluded COD income would be disregarded. While the reduction of X's
basis in property would result in lower depreciation deductions and/or a
higher gain or a lower loss on the disposition of X's property, the
maximum amount of the deferred COD income that would be recognized
in the future would be $150. The $150 would pass through to A, but A
would have received $500 in tax benefits-$100 in suspended ordinary
losses thatA was able to deduct and $400 in increased basis, which would
either reduce A's gain or increase A's loss on a disposition of stock.
Even if X had $500 of basis in its property to be reduced, A would get
the same $500 package of tax benefits, which would exactly offset the
$500 in deferred COD income that could potentially be recognized in the
future.2 12 As the example illustrates, the policy of collecting tax on the

209. See Farley, 202 F.3d at 209.

210. See S. REP. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2 C.B. 620, 625.
211. See id. at 2, reprintedin 1980-2 C.B. at 620-21.
212. Although the dollar amounts would be exactly offsetting, it is noted that the character of
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COD income within a reasonable period would be frustrated by
passthrough of such income to S corporation shareholders.
4. Windfall to the Shareholders
Finally, the Tax Court's construction of section 108(d)(7)(A) prevents
the shareholders of an insolvent S corporation from reaping a windfall. A
windfall would result if the shareholders were allowed to simultaneously
exclude the COD income and increase the basis of their stock when they
neither incurred any economic cost nor made any economic outlay.213
Again, a simple example will illustrate the point. Assume that on January
1, 2000, A is the sole shareholder of X Corporation, an insolvent S
corporation, and that A has no basis in the stock and $3,000,000 of losses
suspended under section 1366(d)(1). Also, assume that during 2000, X is
discharged from $2,000,000 in debt when X is insolvent, and then X is
liquidated, with A receiving nothing in cancellation of A's stock. The
scenario in this example is fairly typical for insolvent companies.
Under section 108(a)(1)(B), the $2,000,000 in COD income would be
excluded from gross income. However, if the excluded COD income
passed through to A under section 1366(a)(1)(A), A's basis would be
increased to $2,000,000 under section 1367(a)(1)(A). This increased basis
would permit A to deduct $2,000,000 of the $3,000,000 in suspended
losses under section 1366(d)(1). The remaining $1,000,000 in suspended
losses would become X's NOL for 2000 under section 108(d)(7)(B). But
as X would be liquidated, the NOL would have no significance. In this
situation, A would be able to deduct $2,000,000 in losses in addition to
being able to exclude the $2,000,000 in COD income. This would happen
even though A had already lost and deducted all of A's investment and had
nothing more to lose. The party bearing the economic cost associated with
A's $2,000,000 deduction would be the corporation's creditor. Permitting
A to increase basis and deduct the $2,000,000 is inconsistent with the tax
policy that the taxpayer must make a "genuine economic outlay" in order
to increase the basis in S corporation stock to "absorb deductions and
losses. 214
Under the Tax Court's interpretation of sections 108(d)(7)(A), 1366
and 1367, A would not include the COD income in gross income (it would
be impossible for A to do so because, under the Tax Court's construction,

the corporation's income and the shareholder's decreased gain/increased loss on the disposition
would differ. The corporation's income would be ordinary, while most of the shareholder's gain
or loss would be capital gain or loss.
213. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 128 (1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 1152(10th Cir.
1999).
214. Id. at 130 n.8 (citing Uri v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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the income would be excluded at the corporate level before it could pass
through to A). The excluded COD income would neither pass through to
A nor increase A's basis. Consequently, A would not get to deduct any of
the $3,000,000 in suspended losses. The $3,000,000 in suspended losses
would become X's NOL for 2000 under section 108(b)(7)(B), and would
be reduced to $1,000,000 after the excluded income would be offset
against the NOL at the corporate level. But, as noted above, the NOL has
no significance because X is liquidated. Under the Tax Court's
construction, the shareholder appropriately gets to exclude the COD
income but cannot deduct any losses that the creditor, in fact, had to bear
as a result of the debt discharge.
Lockhart and Duffy and the Third Circuit would dispute that the
increased basis and A's corresponding deduction of the $2,000,000 in
suspended losses in the above example constitute an unwarranted
windfall.215 The two commentators note that shareholders in S corporations
are able to increase their basis for receipt of tax-exempt income such as the
proceeds of key-person life insurance policies, even though the
shareholders have not "directly incurred an economic outlay of the aftert.x costs of the insurance proceeds. 216 Yet, increasing the basis for life
insurance proceeds is not considered an unwarranted windfall.
There are several problems with this argument. First, there is no
requirement that the outlay be "direct," as opposed to "indirect," for the
shareholder to obtain a basis increase. Second, the shareholders do make
an economic outlay of the proceeds to the extent that such proceeds are
retained by the corporation rather than distributed to the shareholders.
Finally, when it comes to increasing the shareholders' basis, there is an
important distinction between the COD income excluded under section 108
and the life insurance proceeds excluded under section 101 or the
municipal bond interest excluded under section 103. The increased basis
is needed for the life insurance proceeds and the municipal bond interest
in order to ensure that they will not effectively be taxed upon the sale of
the shareholder's stock or the receipt of a corporate distribution. -7 With
respect to the excluded COD income, there is no requirement that it be
preserved as nontaxable. On the contrary, Congress intended to defer, but
eventually collect within a reasonable period,
the tax on the ordinary
21 8
debt.
of
discharge
the
from
realized
income

215. See Lockhart &Duffy, supranote 2, at 303-04; see alsoUnited States v. Farley, 202 F.3d
198, 206 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No.
99-1675) (citing Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 303-04).
216. Lockhart & Duffy, supra note 2, at 303-04.
217. See S. REP. No. 97-640, at 16 (1982), reprintedin 1982-2 C.B. 718, 725.
218. See S. REP. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2 C.B. 620, 625.
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As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Gitlitz, the Internal Revenue Code
should not be construed to confer either a double deduction or a windfall
in the absence of clear Congressional intent.2 19 While the Congressional
plan to increase the basis of S corporation stock for tax-exempt life
insurance proceeds and municipal bond interest is clear, the plan for
excluded COD income is anything but clear. Accordingly, the Tax Court
has properly construed sections 108, 1366 and 1367 to prevent S
corporation shareholders from reaping the windfall associated with passing
through excluded COD income.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court's interpretation of section 108(d)(7)(A) in Nelson carves
out an important exception to the general rule under section 1366 (a)(1)
that all items of income pass through to the shareholders of S corporations.
However, the Tax Court's interpretation is consistent with the statute's
plain meaning and does find support in the legislative history of section
108, particularly section 108(a)(1)(D). Furthermore, the Tax Court's
interpretation of section 108(d)(7)(A) prevents the shareholders of
insolvent S corporations from realizing the windfall of the simultaneous
exclusion of COD income and increase in the basis of their stock. For all
of these reasons, the approach of the Tax Court in Nelson merits approval
by the Supreme Court when it reviews Gitlitz.

219. SeeGitlitzv. Commissioner, 182F.3d 1143,1147-48 (1Oth Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 1830 (2000) (citing United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684, (1969)).
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